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Abstract 
Interoception can be broadly defined as the sense of signals originating within the body. 
As such, interoception is critical for our sense of embodiment, motivation and well-being. 
And yet, despite its importance, interoception remains poorly understood within modern 
science. This paper reviews interdisciplinary perspectives on interoception, with the goal 
of presenting a unified perspective from diverse fields such as neuroscience, clinical 
practice, and contemplative studies. It is hoped that this integrative effort will advance 
our understanding of how interoception determines well-being, and identify the central 
challenges to such understanding. To this end, we introduce an expanded taxonomy of 
interoceptive processes, arguing that many of these processes can be understood through 
an emerging predictive coding model for mind-body integration. The model, which 
describes the tension between expected and felt body sensation, parallels contemplative 
theories, and implicates interoception in a variety of affective and psychosomatic 
disorders. We conclude that maladaptive construal of bodily sensations may lie at the 
heart of many contemporary maladies, and that contemplative practices may attenuate 
these interpretative biases, restoring a person’s sense of presence and agency in the 
world.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Introducing Interoception 
Interoception is the process of receiving, accessing and appraising internal bodily 
signals. Maintaining desired physiological states is critical for an organism’s survival, 
and so interoception is a powerful motivator of behavior in the pursuit of these states 
(Craig, 2002; 2009). While interoceptive awareness has been more narrowly defined as 
the representation of afferent body sensations (Craig, 2003; Critchley et al., 2004), 
broader definitions cast interoception as a multi-dimensional construct that also takes into 
account how people attend to, appraise and respond to these sensations (Vaitl, 1996; 
Cameron, 2001; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2012). Interoception is supported by an 
increasingly well-specified neuro-anatomical pathway with dedicated representation 
cortices akin to the five external senses (Craig, 2002; Critchley et al., 2004; Critchley and 
Harrison, 2013), although the nature of such representation is decidedly more mysterious 
and in need of empirical investigation.  
Interoception is an iterative process, requiring the interplay between perception of 
body states and cognitive appraisal of these states to inform response selection. Afferent 
sensory signals continuously interact with higher order cognitive representations of goals, 
history, and environment, informing emotional experience and motivating regulatory 
behavior (Craig, 2009). Together, these iterations create a sense of self laden with 
motivational context (Damasio, 2003b). Such context may then inform a person’s 
approach or avoidance tendencies, and thus these interactions hold important implications 
for well-being (Beck, 2008). Conversely, life experience impinges upon interoception: 
the perceived availability and relevance of body representations are moderated by factors 
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such as attentional cues (Ainley et al., 2012), contemplative training such as meditation, 
yoga, tai chi, etc. (Bornemann et al., 2014), and age (Khalsa et al., 2009). Understanding 
how interoceptive processing is shaped by experience is therefore important for efforts to 
cultivate well-being and stress resilience. 
1.2. Interoception and Well-Being 
One reason that interoception, a perceptual capacity, is introduced in relation to 
well-being is that it is thought to be intimately connected to self-regulation, having likely 
evolved to help organisms maintain homeostasis (Paulus, 2007; Herbert and Pollatos, 
2012; Craig, 2013; Gu and Fitzgerald, 2014). In modern life, emotionally-valenced body 
signals are also thought to contribute to broader mood states that support emotional 
balance (Paulus and Stein, 2006; Craig, 2007; Seth, 2013). To the extent that a person is 
sensitive to interoceptive signals, such signals guide decision making (Dunn et al., 2010). 
And yet, high sensitivity is not without its price: when body sensation is irregular, as for 
individuals with joint hypermobility, greater interoceptive sensation may also contribute 
to feelings of anxiety (Mallorquí-Bagué et al., 2014). Thus, interoceptive sensitivity may 
either contribute or detract from well-being, suggesting a need for guidance in regulating 
salient visceral signals.  
Paralleling the findings of modern secular clinical science, contemplative science 
suggests that reflection on interoceptive processes is important for adaptive behavior 
(Wallace, 2007), disrupting overlearned perceptual and interpretive habits formed 
throughout cognitive development and aligning behavior with higher-order intentions 
(Vago and Silbersweig, 2012). As the embodied self is more fully realized through 
awareness of ongoing interoceptive interactions, two complimentary senses emerge: 
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presence, one’s connection to the moment, and agency, one’s ability to effect change, 
which are both foundational in determining a person’s sense of well-being (Seth et al., 
2011). To chart interoception’s salutary relevance, research must therefore consider the 
integration of both early sensory and later affective discriminations into a broader 
motivational context.  
1.3. Motivation for the Present Paper 
Over the past decade, the mechanisms of interoceptive awareness, the importance 
of interoceptive cues for physical and psychological health, and the cultivation of healthy 
interoceptive habits through contemplative practices have become topics of active 
investigation. However, insights from these three domains are rarely integrated, impeding 
the progression of understanding their collective significance. In April 2013, the authors 
met to discuss interoception across a variety of perspectives – including neuroscience, 
social and clinical psychology, complementary and alternative care, medicine, Buddhist 
and contemplative studies, and a wealth of personal experiences with contemplative 
practices. Our goal is to better explain how interoceptive information can be revealed and 
masked from conscious awareness, how our appraisals of a given level of interoceptive 
awareness help to determine well-being, and what role contemplative practices may play 
in these processes. 
Here, we attempt to integrate contemporary interoceptive theory from these 
diverse perspectives, in the hope of better specifying interoceptive constructs and 
identifying next steps for advancing the field. First, we define interoception from 
scientific and contemplative perspectives, focusing on a predictive coding model of 
interoceptive representation that is growing in popularity within the scientific 
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community. Second, we discuss the role of interoception for physical and psychological 
well-being, with particular regard for emerging clinical evidence. Third, we explore how 
contemplative practices may interact with interoceptive processes to enhance well-being 
in oneself and connection to others. Finally, we summarize outstanding issues in the 
study of interoception and offer recommendations for future research. 
 
2. Interoception in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Contemplative Traditions 
2.1. Towards a Science of Interoception 
The scientific study of brain, mind, and body provides a framework for 
objectively modeling interoception. Neuroanatomical studies have identified pathways 
that support and modulate interoceptive representations, and as such, may be measurably 
impacted by psychopathology or contemplative practice. This framework is comprised of 
peripheral receptors, C-fiber afferents, spinothalamic projections, specific thalamic 
nuclei, posterior and anterior insula as the limbic sensory cortex, and anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) as the limbic motor cortex (Vaitl, 1996; Bush et al., 2000; Vuilleumier, 
2005; Critchley and Harrison, 2013). In some cases, definitions of interoception extend 
beyond visceral afferents (Sherrington, 1906) to include afferents from other deep body 
receptors, such as C-tactile somatic receptors of the skin that are associated with internal 
feelings of warmth or pleasure from gentle touch (Björnsdotter et al., 2009), circulating 
chemicals, proprioceptive inputs, and unexpected or yet unknown sites, such as recently-
discovered photoreceptor cells within the eyes (Lucas, 2013).  
The anatomical pathways for interoception are well-specified, detailing the 
connections between sensory receptors, spinal cord, brainstem and brain (Craig, 2002). 
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Neurotransmitter concentrations in the insula and ACC in particular have been associated 
with subjective interoceptive awareness and subjective well-being (Ernst et al., 2013; 
Wiebking et al., 2014). However, how such neural representations are constructed and the 
mechanisms by which they influence cognition remain unclear. Most investigations have 
focused narrowly on interoceptive awareness, which may only be one aspect of 
interoceptive processing. Interrelated but distinct constructs such as interoceptive 
attention tendency, sensitivity, coherence between physiology and subjective experience, 
accuracy, and regulatory habits may all emerge as important properties of information 
propagation and integration throughout interoceptive networks (Box 1). 
Box 1. A Taxonomy of Interoception Terms 
 
Interoception has been generally construed as the representation of the individual’s body 
at a particular point in time (Craig, 2002), but accounts differ on how interoceptive 
capacity should be measured. Similar to a recently proposed model (Garfinkel and 
Critchley, 2013), we suggest several criteria to supplement the measurement of 
interoception:  
• Interoceptive awareness, such as the sense of one’s heart beating, is the most common 
measure of interoception, and is usually operationalized in terms of the reportability 
of interoceptive signals. However, awareness may be a limited criterion, as 
interoceptive processes may operate implicitly, such as thermoregulation promoting 
shivering even when one is asleep (Craig, 2003).  
• Coherence between physiological and subjective states measures the degree to which 
objectively observable interoceptive signals manifest in reportable experience. For 
example, low blood sugar (hypoglycemia) is characterized both by interoceptive 
signals (Herbert et al., 2012a) and irritability (Matthew et al., 1997). However, 
awareness of low blood sugar is not necessary for it to promote irritability (Taylor and 
Rachman, 1988; Matthew et al., 1997). Coherence appears to vary widely among 
individuals, even though both are impacted by environmental stressors (Sze et al., 
2010).  
• Attention tendency refers to whether a person habitually attends to particular 
interoceptive signals, potentially inhibiting or ignoring others (Pollatos et al., 2005). It 
can also be expressed as whether a person attends more to interoceptive than 
exteroceptive sources of information. 
• Sensitivity refers to the minimum threshold for detecting interoceptive signal change 
(Holzl et al., 1996); sensitivity may operate at multiple levels of the representational 
system, culminating in access to conscious awareness. Although not often used in 
interoception research, specificity is the common counterpart to sensitivity in signal 
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detection theory (Abdi, 2007), the ability to reject competing signals from being 
classified as interoceptive afferent signals. 
• Accuracy is perhaps the most commonly investigated measure of interoception, and 
refers to the ability to reliably discriminate interoceptive signals from noise or 
competing signals (Vaitl, 1996), and between different levels of signal intensity 
(Daubenmier et al., 2013). It appears that accuracy varies widely between individuals 
(Critchley et al., 2004; Ceunen et al., 2013), but may improve with focused training 
(Brener, 1977; Daubenmier et al., 2013; Mirams et al., 2013). Accuracy is usually 
thought to be a function of sensitivity and specificity. 
• Sensibility refers to an individual’s personal account of how they experience internal 
sensations, including a confidence estimate of one’s own interoceptive ability and 
feelings of engagement during interoception (Garfinkel et al., 2015). Sensibility is 
often gauged using interviews and/or questionnaires, frequently the Porges Body 
Perception Questionnaire (Porges, 1993) is applied. The usefulness of this instrument 
for interoception, however, has been questioned as it appears to primarily serve as a 
proxy measure for anxiety-related symptoms (Mehling et al., 2009) . The Scale of 
Body Connection (Price and Thompson, 2007) and the Multidimensional Assessment 
of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) (Mehling et al., 2012) were created in part to 
help extend interoceptive assessment. 
• Regulation refers to how well a person can match an interoceptive signal to his or her 
desired state. Regulation can involve shaping either the signal or the desire. For 
example, regulation could shape interoceptive signals to meet goals through 
reappraisal, suppression, or distraction, techniques often cited in modern scientific 
models of emotion regulation (Gross, 2002). However, regulation could also follow 
more contemplative traditions, intentionally accepting and examining such signals 
with curiosity, a strategy that encourages shifts in interoceptive experience without 
attempting to control unexpected interoceptive signals or create desirable ones. 
Concurrent measurement of these constructs may inform a more complete model of 
interoception, its relationship to well-being, and the effects of contemplative training 
 
It is important to note that these constructs have varied definitions across the literature. 
Sensitivity and accuracy are combined as interoceptive accuracy in a recent interoception 
model (Garfinkel et al., 2015), measured as the performance on objective behavioral tests 
such as the heartbeat detection task, and clearly distinguished from interoceptive 
awareness and interoceptive sensibility. In the Garfinkel et al. model, interoceptive 
awareness has been operationalized as “metacognitive awareness of interoceptive 
accuracy, e.g. confidence-accuracy correspondence” (p. 65). However, the term 
metacognitive awareness is also a term commonly used in contemplative practice 
pointing to the possibility of taking awareness itself and the process of thinking as an 
object of attention and has been defined elsewhere as the ability to reflect or be aware of 
ongoing thought or mental states (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Epel et al., 2009). 
There, it has been defined as the ability to experience negative thoughts and feelings as 
mental events that pass through the mind, rather than as a part of the self (Herbert and 
Forman, 2011). We would therefore avoid using the term “metacognitive awareness” to 
mean confidence-accuracy correspondence, preferring the term coherence instead. Thus, 
the terms listed above represent an attempt to bring a common taxonomy to our 
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discussion, but should not be read as universally definitive in this developing field of 
inquiry. 
 
Adding to the complexity, multiple interoceptive sub-systems operate 
concurrently, and may each afford different capacities and tendencies. There is some 
evidence for general, multimodal interoceptive capacity: heartbeat detection accuracy is 
correlated with gastric sensitivity (Herbert et al., 2012b), and sometimes with pain 
sensitivity in some studies (Pollatos et al., 2012), but not with others (Werner et al., 
2009). Furthermore, the relationship between interoceptive constructs across domains 
such as the heartbeat, blood glucose, respiration, temperature and other modalities is 
largely unknown. This gap in understanding may be due to the fact that most 
interoception studies gauge accuracy within a single modality, and do not measure related 
constructs such attention habits, regulation ability, or sensitivity to signal change, all of 
which converge to support interoceptive awareness (Ceunen et al., 2013).  
Acknowledgement of interoception’s multimodal and multifaceted nature is 
important, because consideration of these factors in isolation can lead to spurious 
inferences. For example, knowledge that meditators have strong interoceptive attention 
tendencies might lead one to expect them also to possess superior accuracy in heartbeat 
detection, an idea contradicted by recent research on this topic (Khalsa et al., 2008; 
Parkin et al., 2013). The benefits of interoceptive attention in a particular domain such as 
breath or body monitoring therefore seem to be independent from a domain-general 
enhancement of interoceptive accuracy. Instead, meditation practices appears to promote 
changes in a more specific subset of interoceptive capacities and tendencies, 
accompanied by non-interoceptive factors such as changes in intentions or goal-
orientations unique to each system of practice (Bornemann et al., 2014).  
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Just as capacity may vary across interoceptive modalities, interoceptive constructs 
may also vary independently within a given modality. For example, sensitivity may be 
high without commensurate accuracy or regulation ability, such as with uncontrollable 
interoceptive ‘false alarms’ often observed in anxiety disorders (Paulus and Stein, 2006; 
Domschke et al., 2010). For this reason, rather than arguing for the primacy of any of one 
interoceptive construct, the present discussion uses the term interoception to describe 
general processes of perceiving body states, while also acknowledging that a variety of 
contextual factors influence specific interoceptive capacities. A huge amount of research 
is needed to begin to catalogue the relationships between specific capacities and 
modalities, let alone their plasticity and effects on well-being. 
2.2. Integrating Contemplative Insights 
If we could establish a working model of interoception that accounts for 
differences in how interoceptive signals are represented and managed, it is likely that 
some sub-systems would be more relevant for well-being than others. It is at this point 
that contemplative science and paradigms of cognitive processing may be extremely 
helpful, implicating particular interoceptive processes, addressing how interoception 
ideally functions, and how such function is shaped by experience. In particular, 
contemplative accounts have much to say on the distinction between maladaptive 
interoceptive conditioning that may lead to disorders, and adaptive learning that is 
purportedly engendered by contemplative practices.  
Here, we refer to contemplative practice in the broadest sense, i.e., traditions of 
first-person reflection upon or cultivation of specific modes of experience, and focus on 
those practices that explicitly involve interoceptive awareness, including types of 
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meditation and mindfulness-based approaches that allocate attention to body sensations 
(e.g., the breath), or to specific areas of the body (e.g., the center of the abdomen) (Kabat-
Zinn, 1982), and yoga, tai chi, and other mind-body practices performed in or outside of 
an explicit spiritual context (Baer, 2003). A wealth of other body-oriented healing and 
psychotherapy methods may also fall into this classification, such as Dialectical-
Behavioral Therapy (Linehan et al., 1999), Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes 
et al., 1999), and also body-mind approaches such as Feldenkrais (Buchanan and Ulrich, 
2001), Alexander method (Woodman and Moore, 2012), Focusing (Gendlin, 2012), 
Rosen work (Fogel, 2009), Hakomi (Kurtz, 1997), Sensory Awareness (Selver et al., 
2007), Somatic Experiencing (Payne et al., 2015), Breath Therapy (Mehling, 2001), 
Holotropic Breathwork (Grof and Grof, 2010), and Mindful Awareness in Body-oriented 
Therapy (MABT) (Price, 2005). We discuss primarily practices derived from Asian 
contemplative traditions, as these have undergone the most research and been the focus 
for the largest effort to translate contemplative concepts into modern scientific terms. 
This is not meant to exclude other contemplative traditions, and we hope future research 
will be extended into other such areas. 
Classical contemplative practices such as mindfulness and equanimity seem to 
speak to the issues of how interoceptive signals are integrated into a complex 
representation of self and the world beyond, and have models of how they affect health 
and well-being. There are, however, several outstanding challenges to realizing the 
potential benefits of these classical traditions in secular modern society. The first issue is 
the lack of equivalence between traditional contemplative and modern secular practices: 
although mindfulness has found a strong representation in secular clinical therapies and 
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sciences, it is disputed whether this translation remains faithful to its classical sources 
(Christopher et al., 2009; Grossman, 2011), and little attention has been given to the 
diversity of interpretations of mindfulness within the Buddhist tradition itself (Williams 
and Kabat-Zinn, 2011), which may present competing models for interoceptive 
representation and function. Second, while both clinical science and contemplative 
traditions share the goal of reducing human suffering, they differ in scope. In modern 
secular contexts, practice goals are largely pragmatic, aimed at reducing affective 
symptoms and improving daily function. By contrast, classical traditions tend to orient 
toward more extensive change, seeking to generate insight into the fundamental nature of 
reality, with the intention of liberating individuals from their conditioned states 
(Grossman and Van Dam, 2011). It is uncertain whether current appropriations of 
classical contemplative practices are sufficient to promote their historically-lauded 
benefits. Given emerging evidence of contemplative practices’ efficacies in secular 
contexts, there is reason for optimism that at least some beneficial elements have been 
successfully translated (Farb, 2014). However, our understanding of these practices’ true 
mechanisms of action has lagged behind the scientific validation of their efficacies. There 
may be central constructs in classical contemplative theory that have yet to be 
operationalized in scientific discourse, let alone empirically studied. 
Despite the great heterogeneity among contemplative traditions, we may begin by 
selecting a common concept that may contribute to scientific discourse: that of the ‘subtle 
body’. Contemplative practices such as mindfulness are traditionally grounded in 
traditions, epistemologies and medical treatises that articulate holistic rather than 
dualistic models of body and mind (Mehling et al., 2011). Such traditional sources each 
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have their own distinct theories of the psycho-physical complex and invoke concepts of 
subtle body structures and ‘currents’ flowing through those structures (Samuel, 2008; 
Klein, 2013). These structures and ‘flows’ are amenable to influencing and being 
influenced by the mind, emotions, posture and the condition of the grosser (physical) 
body. Their presence is indicated through awareness of a rich array of internal body 
sensations and a long phenomenological history of sensate processes that relate events 
occurring in the outside world to the experience within an individual. Exploring these 
somatic sensations, their sources, and their modulation has been an important focus of 
Tibetan, Chinese, and Indian medicine, represented in anatomical maps of channels, 
meridians, and ‘energy centers’ (chakras: Sanskrit) through which ‘subtle energies’ pass 
known as lung/ch’i/prāṇa, respectively (Loizzo et al., 2009; Klein, 2014). Every mental 
event - that is, all states of consciousness- are said to ride the ‘steed of wind’ or ‘energy’ 
currents. It is currently unclear how these conceptualizations map onto scientific 
approaches of interoception. However, these concepts do suggest that attention to 
embodied experience is significant for self-representation and well-being, and therefore 
supports the more general hypothesis that over-dependence on top-down, or merely 
conceptual (in contrast to sensory) awareness significantly limits a human being’s 
potential for relating to self, others, and the world. 
2.3. Integration Challenges 
Asian classical traditions have a rich history of describing the integration of 
varied interoceptive signals into a common representation, a phenomenon often referred 
to as the ‘subtle body’ (Samuel, 2008; Klein, 2013). The subtlety of this body has to do 
with its typically functioning outside the horizon of ordinary consciousness. However, as 
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already indicated, as the ‘steed’ or support of consciousness, it impacts perception 
significantly. We suggest that scientific discourse is just beginning to address this 
question of integrated representation, creating new possibilities for understanding what 
differentiates wholesome from maladaptive integration states. And yet, there are few 
empirical accounts of such integration, and so the potential to operationalize fundamental 
constructs from these traditions and practices is largely unknown. For example, many 
contemplative traditions, and many practitioners, speak of changes in the ‘flow of 
energy,’ resulting in feelings of lightness or heat, but it is largely unknown whether 
modern psychophysiological research methods can detect such changes (Loizzo et al., 
2009; Kozhevnikov et al., 2013). Physiological arousal itself is inherently ambiguous and 
highly constrained by cognitive appraisal (Blascovich and Tomaka, 1996), and the 
science of how interoceptive appraisals translate into distinct emotional experiences is 
inexact at best (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013). Given this uncertainty, we might begin 
by searching for the training-related changes described in classical contemplative theories 
of interoceptive integration. Such descriptions offer a rich set of testable hypotheses for 
filling this explanatory gap between physiology and experience. Inclusion of first-person 
experiences, particularly from people with extensive training in directing and reporting 
on interoceptive attention, may be an important step in developing more comprehensive 
models of interoception (Gallagher, 1997; Lutz and Thompson, 2003).  
As an example of such hypothesis testing, we might consider a classical 
description of the first steps in mindfulness training. Classical Buddhist texts, such as the 
5th century Path of Purification, describe the primary goal of early mindfulness training is 
to develop stable awareness of momentary sensation, distinguishing it from awareness of 
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conceptual thought (Buddhaghosa, 2010). Recent scientific investigation suggests that the 
conceptualization of an experience, which may include detailed description and analysis 
of events that are associated with the experience and shaped by our collective cultural 
socialization, and the actual felt, immediate experience itself, which may arise in the 
body spontaneously, activate dissociable neural networks, and that the strength of this 
dissociation is indeed sensitive to mindfulness training (Farb et al., 2007). In this way, 
contemplative traditions provide a ground for distinction that is ripe for translation into 
objective, neuroscientific terms. Representation of the momentary, sensory self is 
relevant to practices of compassion and insight, as well to the classic mindfulness 
practices that undergird them. 
Learning to attend to visceral, momentary sensation is only one step of many in 
the path to well-being, and likewise a neural distinction between immediate interoceptive 
and conceptual processing is only an initial step in the development of a scientific model. 
As will be discussed, access to visceral sensations may be helpful or harmful to a person 
depending on how such awareness is understood. Under the right conditions, 
contemplative practices may have therapeutic impact on health and well-being (Farb et 
al., 2012a), as has been shown in experiential psychotherapy research for some time (for 
a review, see (Hendricks, 2001). On the other hand, interoceptive signals may also be 
catastrophized in panic and related disorders. Understanding how to skillfully relate to 
interoceptive sensations, and under what circumstances they should be attended to, is 
therefore a central question for the study of interoceptive training for well-being. To 
progress from a general description of interoceptive processing towards characterizing 
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the wholesomeness of such processing requires a greater level of theoretical complexity, 
the beginnings to which we will attempt to address. 
2.4. Regulation through Simulation 
A scientific model of interoception requires some description of how diffuse 
sensory signals become integrated into a holistic representation of the body, one that is 
amenable to integration with higher-order cognition. The concept of a simulation map 
provides one way to characterize such integration. An analogue of the contemplative 
subtle body, the simulation map is also known as an “as-if” representation, a neural 
representation of the body, a relatively stable abstraction of rapidly fluctuating sensory 
events (Damasio, 2003a; Seth and Critchley, 2013). From a computational perspective, 
the simulation map is the ongoing selection of encoded body states into a working 
memory buffer that serves as the best approximation of the body’s current state as 
predicted by these prior states. The simulation map is layered, with lowest layers being 
closest to raw sensory afferents from the body, and higher layers representing the 
aggregation of information at these lower layers into representations that may be 
accessible to consciousness. As such, the simulation map affords executive brain areas 
with relatively stable sensory representations from which to interpret experience and 
coordinate responses. The concept of a simulation map provides a rich canvas on which 
to observe the nuances and variability in the cognitive representation of interoceptive 
signals, and furthermore suggests how such representations may be altered, both through 
the voluntary deployment of attention, and through the relatively involuntary processes of 
attentional conditioning across the lifespan, such as sensory degradation in aging (Baltes 
and Lindenberger, 1997).  
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It is important to stress that the simulation map is not identical to current 
sensation, but is rather an abstraction from recent sensory experience. Current sensation 
refers to the current set of sensory inputs arriving at primary interoceptive representation 
areas of the brain, most likely including the nucleus of the solitary tract, thalamus, 
posterior insula, and somatosensory cortices (Craig, 2002; Critchley and Harrison, 2013). 
The simulation map on the other hand is a filtered and integrated representation of these 
sensory afferents- it is, in effect, an interpreted signal. When considering regulatory 
motivation, a central question is the degree to which unexpected sensations are viewed as 
acceptable, as opposed to problematic, deviations from one’s expected body state.  
Like many neural representations, the contents of the simulation map may not be 
fully accessible to consciousness. Of the many simulation layers, only a subset will be 
accessible to conscious experience. Thus, the conscious, phenomenal map may not be the 
same as the broader simulation map, although we view the simulation map as necessary 
for phenomenal bodily experience. Furthermore, there is large inter-individual variability 
among phenomenal maps as a function of goals, culture, personal experience, and 
possibly genetics and other contributing factors (Ferron, 1997; Altabe, 1998; Ma-Kellams 
et al., 2012; Maister and Tsakiris, 2014). These factors may combine to limit how the 
simulation map is consciously accessed, and a history of biased simulation map access 
may override momentary introspective efforts. Given that the simulation map may only 
be partially accessible to conscious introspection, it may be impractical to rely entirely on 
subjective reports to gauge individual or cultural differences in simulation map 
composition. However, the simulation map may be tractably examined at the level of 
neural representation, serving as a substrate for a person’s sense of embodiment in the 
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world. Through investigation of the simulation map, the visceral source of our sense of 
our presence and our motivations towards action may be understood. 
Neuroscience techniques have helped to move beyond subjective reports in 
modeling interoceptive simulation maps. By tracking changes in interoceptive signals and 
subjective body experiences during recordings of brain activity, researchers have begun 
to create rich models that distinguish between bottom-up sensory signals and top-down 
sensory predictions. For example, neuroimaging research suggests that attention to the 
body increases activity at the corresponding level of the spinal cord (Nejad, 2014), 
suggesting that interoceptive attention may operate even upon relatively distal aspects of 
the central nervous system. Within the brain, it appears that the middle insula integrates 
afferent interoceptive information with exteroceptive context into broader motivational 
space, but individuals differ in the degree to which such information propagates to the 
prefrontal cortex, and presumably conscious awareness, as a function of interoceptive 
practice (Singer et al., 2009; Farb et al., 2012b). In addition to neuroimaging, it should be 
noted that many other psychophysiological indicators of interoceptive processing show 
promise for revealing interoceptive processing in the absence of participant report, such 
as heartbeat-evoked potentials (Leopold and Schandry, 2001), respiratory-related 
potentials (Von Leupoldt et al., 2010), cardiac modulation of startle (Schulz et al., 2009), 
or EEG-ECG single trial covariation (Mueller et al., 2013). For example, Von Leupoldt et 
al. (2010) demonstrated that respiratory occlusion produced a reliable respiratory-related 
evoked potential measurable by EEG, which serves as an index of cortical tracking of 
interoceptive signals. Mueller et al. (2013) indexed interoceptive processing by the 
degree to which EEG responses to task feedback predicted subsequent heartbeat 
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acceleration. While it is not our intention to describe all of such techniques in depth, such 
methods may provide objective indices of the impact of interoceptive signals at different 
levels of neural representation, such as the brainstem or cortex. 
Perhaps the most important application of the simulation map is in explaining 
how visceral feeling promotes action. This explanatory construct is needed in both 
scientific and contemplative accounts of bodily health: analogous to the simulation map, 
contemplative traditions posit the existence of a subtle body, including various quasi-
physical and delicate elements of the body that integrate and organize visceral feelings to 
provide a sense of well-being (Samuel, 2008). Across both scientific and contemplative 
traditions, motivational salience is afforded to simulation maps or subtle bodies in the 
form of emotional valence, with aversive or negative valence signaling a need to return to 
certain adaptive homeostatic ranges. The motivated process of achieving homeostasis, 
through physiological or behavioral change, has been dubbed allostasis (Sterling and 
Eyer, 1988).  
In mammals, allostasis comprises many integrated functions and includes 
autonomic, neuroendocrine and behavioral mechanisms. Much of allostasis occurs 
through autonomic self-regulatory physiology- it occurs internally and automatically. For 
example, we do not choose nor directly sense the dilation of blood vessels or pupils in 
response changing luminance or emotional relevance, and yet such physiological 
accommodations occur continuously to promote homeostatic ends. A complete 
understanding of interoception doubtlessly requires the modeling of these allostatic 
reflexes, especially when their dysregulation acts as a source of suffering. Theories of 
early contemplative practice are agnostic to the ultimate accessibility of such responses, 
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although direct experience of one’s visceral stress response and its triggering conditions 
are essential for the types of insights that will promote the liberation from motivation 
driven by conditioned expectations (Goleman, 2008; Hart, 2011). At some point, 
simulation map theories must account for how even subtle representations can lead to 
conscious insight that promotes behavior change. 
The relationship of the simulation map to Asian (especially Indian and Tibetan) 
mappings of the ‘energy circuits’ within the body bears further investigation. At this 
stage, we note that, like the contents of the simulation map, many ‘energy flows’ within 
the body are not available to consciousness. However, these ‘energy flows’ are always, in 
traditional theorizing, intimately associated with consciousness. These ‘flows’ are 
capable of being brought to consciousness through training. As with the simulation map, 
these ‘energies’ seem formative of a person’s sense of embodiment, emotional 
orientation, agency, purpose, and sense of self-worth. Unlike the simulation model, 
perhaps, the mind-energy interaction is less dualistic than the visceral-cognitive dyad that 
so far seems central to characterization of the simulation map.  
Leaving aside the question of how very subtle interoceptive afferents can be 
shaped to yield conscious insight, interoceptive signals motivate a wealth of unsubtle, 
overt behavior to satisfy allostatic concerns. Interoceptive dynamics are critical to 
understanding why identical stimuli can promote divergent behaviors. For example, a 
person will approach a heat source in a cold environment but avoid it when the ambient 
temperature is high. Conversely, an ice cube in one’s hand can feel pleasant during a hot 
summer day but aversive in winter. The meaning of the ice cube cannot be modeled 
based on the sense-perception of the ice cube alone, but rather the coolness of the ice is 
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situated within a broader interoceptive milieu, one that rewards or punishes cold 
sensation in response to thermoregulatory imperatives. Furthermore, allostatic cues can 
inform cognition and behavior at higher levels of representation- our trust in others is 
exaggerated by warm sensations and attenuated by cold sensations (Kang et al., 2010). 
If an ice cube’s value is deeply influenced by allostatic concerns, a complete 
model of interoception must describe how such influence comes about. While 
acknowledging that many physiological perturbations are addressed unconsciously, 
through autonomic control of the internal milieu, conscious regulatory acts seem 
structured to resolve interactions between the body and its external environment (Gu and 
Fitzgerald, 2014). In this way, interoceptive signals motivate overt behavior that feeds 
back upon our physiology. It is also important to note that not all motivated behavior is 
allostatic: hedonic and pragmatic goals also have a large role to play, such as sensation-
seeking to distract or regulate low mood (Taylor and Hamilton, 1997), or self-
caffeinating in the face of fatigue (Lorist and Tops, 2003). Thus while homeostatic 
demands provide a convenient heuristic for predicting regulatory motivation, we must 
consider that many of our dominant drives sacrifice balance in the body to achieve other 
goals: riding roller-coasters, watching horror movies, and consuming spicy or sugary 
foods all fall into this category, in which extremes of arousal are intentionally provoked 
and enjoyed. Interoceptive regulation thus includes more than allostatic goals, but indeed 
any action intended to reshape the sensory signals that constitute the interoceptive 
simulation map. Rather than basing motivation on homeostasis, it may be represented 
more flexibly by how closely sensations match predicted or desired states. 
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2.5. The Predictive Coding Model of Interoception  
In recognition of the complexity of interoceptive processing, the “predictive 
coding” model of interoception has recently been introduced to the discourse on 
interoception (Seth et al., 2011; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Seth, 2013; Apps 
and Tsakiris, 2014). This model makes use of a final critical attribute of interoception, in 
that interoceptive processing regularly involves a comparison between immediate 
sensation and simulated past and future states. Comparison between observed and 
expected or desired states may then motivate behavior to resolve the discrepancy (Paulus 
and Stein, 2010; Seth, 2013). From an evolutionary perspective, awareness of 
interoceptive processes may promote adaptive behavior (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013), 
and body-focused contemplative practices may support such awareness (Mehling et al., 
2011; Price et al., 2012b). We shall argue that the predictive coding model helps to 
operationalize many of the claims around the role of interoception in contemplative 
practice, particularly surrounding the deconditioning of maladaptive regulatory habits.  
--- Please Insert Figure 1 Approximately Here --- 
The idea that the simulation map can represent states distinct from one’s current 
interoceptive milieu suggests that comparisons are continuously being made within a 
given layer of the map, between the current sensation of the body, and the body as it is 
expected to be based upon past experience (the prior). The simulation is constructed 
through the consideration of both ongoing sensation and priors which contextualize these 
sensations. Each layer of the simulation map has its own set of priors, based on that 
layer’s experience with past sensory inputs and adjustments to these priors influenced by 
top-down expectancy signals. When a prior diverges from incoming sensation, it may 
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update the simulation at that layer, creating a posterior probability that serves as a 
descending input for lower layers of the simulation map. For example, a person may go 
outside and be surprised by unexpectedly hot weather. Such surprise may begin at lower 
layers of the simulation map, promoting that is largely unconscious and automatic, 
targeting local physiology, such as the dilation of blood vessels in response to a rise in 
temperature. If rapid, automatic regulatory responses fail to reduce prediction error, a 
prior is updated, forming a posterior probability that updates a lower sensory layer in the 
map hierarchy to ‘expect’ hotter temperatures. It is likely that updating of priors at lower 
layers of the map is therefore itself involuntary and automatic, and not subject to 
conscious deliberation or intentionality. On the other hand, at higher levels of the 
simulation map, conscious deliberation may select among several regulatory alternatives 
for minimizing prediction error. In the hot weather example, one might choose to seek 
shelter from the heat, or appraise the heat as welcome and attempt to enjoy the warm air. 
Whether one selects to regulate sensation to fit the prior, or allows the prior to be 
updated, is an important regulatory distinction that will be discussed at length below. For 
now, the critical point is that the ability for sensations to motivate regulatory responses is 
driven by the magnitude of the prediction error, the deviation from the priors at a given 
layer of simulation. The involvement of higher order cognition in this resolution process 
is determined by how high an error signal processes up through layers of the simulation 
map before it is resolved, with larger discrepancies being more likely to be make their 
way up through the layers to reach conscious awareness. 
The comparison between sensed and expected states, reminiscent of Higgins’ self-
discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), serves two major functions: i) to orient us to 
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surprising physiological changes that require immediate attention, and ii) to allow 
comparison between current and potential future states as a cue to action. In the face of a 
mismatch between sensed and expected states, active inference promotes responses 
intended to shape the interoceptive milieu to match expected states. For example, given 
an unexpected headache, one may feel an urge to take a pain-killer, in order to restore 
one’s desired, habitual pain-free state. Not all active inference requires overt behavioral 
intervention, nor even awareness of a prediction error: some forms of active inference are 
physiological, wherein the autonomic nervous system regulates physiologically largely 
automatically and unconsciously to return the body to its expected state (Gu and 
Fitzgerald, 2014). On the other hand, when exposed to stressors that exceed one’s 
autonomic regulatory capacity, cascading prediction errors may reach levels of the 
simulation map that are accessible to conscious awareness. Such awareness prompts overt 
active inference, by which one interacts with the environment to approach an expected 
state (Seth, 2013). Critical to our definition, both physiological and overt forms of active 
inference seek to reduce prediction error by changing sensation to approach prior 
expectations rather than updating the priors themselves.  
However, active inference is not the only way to reduce the disparity between 
current and desired states. One may also adjust one’s expected state to match the internal 
milieu. The process of updating the expected simulation map to more accurately reflect 
immediate sensation is known as perceptual inference (Seth, 2013). A person’s goals and 
attitudes towards interoceptive sensation may powerfully influence the form of inference 
made (Box 2).  
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Box 2. How motivation shapes interoceptive inference. 
 Given the power of interoceptive signals to alternately capture attention and provoke 
regulatory behavior, achieving an optimal balance between active and perceptual 
inference seems central to successful self-regulation. The tension between interrogating 
perception and formulating a response has been addressed in recent models of 
interoception processing (Hankin, 2012; Paulus et al., 2012; Seth, 2013), and we 
elaborate on it here to discuss the role of contemplative practice in addressing the 
relatively underspecified process of perceptual inference. At the level of perception, 
interoception requires a mental representation of body state as well as tactile or other 
related sensory information within the simulation map, which is constrained both by 
bottom-up sensory inputs, and by top-down expectations based on the stored knowledge 
of prior interoceptive states and knowledge of one’s current context. Neither sensory 
afferents nor prior representations are necessarily accessible to conscious awareness, 
although particular layers of the simulation map may become the objects of awareness. 
Motivation within the model is generated as a response to discrepancies between the 
simulated and incoming interoceptive signal, which is also referred to as the prediction 
error or ‘surprise’ signal (Figure 1A). Incoming sensory signals are contrasted against 
prior information at a given level of the simulation layer. Discrepancies between the 
sensation and prior feed up through simulation layers, and generally trigger regulatory 
activities to maintain a homeostatic state.  Ultimately, prediction errors are resolved by 
attributing causes to the unexpected signal, resulting in the creation of a posterior 
probability that cascades down simulation layers to update priors and reduce prediction 
error.  The posterior probability determines the meaning of the signal and consequently 
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the nature of the regulatory response. 
Interoceptive sensitivity to unexpected, afferent interoceptive signals describes 
how readily a prediction error propagates up through simulation layers, serving as a basis 
for motivation in dynamic interoceptive representation. However, sensitivity alone does 
not speak to differences in how a person responds to the motivating discrepancy signal. 
Top-down cognitive factors in the forms of goals, causal appraisals, and contextual cues 
help to shape the motivated response. The tension between active and perceptual 
inference is often resolved by how one responds to the surprising mismatch between 
simulation and sensation. If current goals lead one to value regulation over accuracy of 
the interoceptive signal, priors at lower layers will be updated with an inferred 
explanatory cause (the posterior probability) from the discrepant layer that suggests overt 
active inference to address this cause. In this situation, surprise is minimized by down-
weighting discrepant sensory information in favor of acting to restore a previously 
expected state (Figure 1B). In active inference, the simulation is closely aligned with the 
prior, and the individual attempts to shape incoming sensation to match the prior, thereby 
reducing prediction error. Conversely, if a person values accuracy over regulation, he or 
she will place high weight on sensory relative to prior information, updating the posterior 
to create a simulation that matches the unexpected afferent sensory information without 
attempting to restore a prior state (Figure 1C). In perceptual inference, the updated 
simulation departs from the prior and aligns with incoming sensory information; the 
posterior probability updates the prior rather than prompting efforts to change the sensory 
input, thereby reducing prediction error. In either situation, the discrepancy is minimized; 
the concept of sensory precision weighting allows the model to predict how such 
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minimization occurs.  
It is unknown how the different forms of inference will affect the distribution of 
priors in calculating prediction error. If perceptual inference allows for greater updating 
of priors, then it will likely promote greater variability of priors than active inference, 
which attempts to constrain the simulation to fit an existing set of priors. For perceptual 
inference, the distribution of sensory information is rendered more precise instead of the 
priors. These precise sensory distributions will have greater impact on higher level 
posterior probabilities, which feed back upon the simulation, making it more accurate 
while being agnostic to its effects on the prior distribution. If the body shows greater 
variation in sensation than in prior experience, then the priors will become less precise; if 
however it turns out that the body is displaying a sensory input that is more consistent 
than in prior experience, then one should expect to see more precise priors following 
updating. It is our yet untested hypothesis that for most people there is greater variation in 
the body than we tend to expect, and so the effect of contemplative practice will be to 
expand the range of anticipated experiences rather than hone in on any one experience, 
leading to a broadening of the prior distribution. The consequence of such broadening is 
that the simulation map will more accurately reflect sensory experience as it is less 
influenced by a rigid prior and more so by incoming sensation.  
While active and perceptual inference both seek to minimize the disparity 
between sensed and expected states, they differ in their means of reducing this disparity. 
Overt active inference is a process by which an organisms acts to confirm/disconfirm 
attributed causes of unexpected interoceptive sensation, whereas perceptual inference acts 
to reduce the surprising nature of the sensation by broadening sensory expectations, 
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reducing their inferential weight on the simulation layer. In many ways, this distinction is 
analogous to the difference between modern psychological and contemplative accounts of 
emotion regulation. While modern psychological models often discuss suppression, 
distraction, or reappraisal to alter the characteristics of the interoceptive signal (Gross, 
2002), contemplative traditions make use of terms such as acceptance and equanimity, or 
simply continuous non-interfering observation, as ways of changing ones attitude towards 
sensation rather than attempting to change sensation itself (Mikulas, 2011). More recent 
secular adaptations of contemplative traditions almost universally feature integration of 
these perceptual inference strategies.  
We note that this conceptualization of acceptance or equanimity as a ‘bottom-up’ 
perceptual rather than ‘top-down’ cognitive strategy may be controversial, but believe 
that this distinction is critical for understanding contemplative therapies’ intended 
mechanisms of action. Indeed, contemplative therapies may be valuable precisely 
because they challenge existing models of ‘top-down’ emotion regulation by introducing 
the idea that sometimes attempting to control or regulate emotional experience is itself 
the problem. In a system where perception and appraisal are seemingly obligatory, 
iterating steps in human experience, perceptual inference may facilitate emotion 
regulation by reducing overlearned and seemingly obligatory perception-appraisal 
associations. Appraisals will still follow perceptions, but they need not be so stereotyped 
and rigidly constrained. 
The distinction between active and perceptual inference matters in everyday life: 
for example, consider a person experiencing a sense of restlessness, who infers that her 
unexpected restlessness stems from hunger. In this case, active inference rapidly pairs an 
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unexpected interoceptive signal with an externally-directed behavioral response intended 
to restore the interoceptive milieu to its expected, homeostatic state. In doing so, active 
inference shifts attention away from interoception itself, at least temporarily. If it turns 
out that the restlessness stems from some other source, such as workplace stress, active 
inference’s promotion of a shift from interoception to regulation reduces the opportunity 
to explore unfolding interoceptive signals. By contrast, perceptual inference involves 
reducing reliance on prior expectations in the face of an unexpected sensation. Through 
perceptual inference, the state of restlessness becomes the new expected state. From this 
perspective, the dynamic time course of arousal may be explored, including attention to 
conditions associated with changing interoceptive states. With time and reflection, 
perceptual inference might allow the individual to realize that her arousal was greatest 
when thinking about the workplace, and that the arousal was not actually a hunger signal. 
Over repeated applications of perceptual inference, prior expectations for arousal may 
change so that arousal following reflection on the workplace is no longer unexpected, but 
is instead a familiar consequence of such reflection. Knowledge of such conditioning 
may then afford new regulatory opportunities, a more adaptive set of priors for 
anticipating and explaining physiological arousal. 
If perceptual inference provides grounds for personal insight, moving directly 
from an unexpected sensation to regulation (overt active inference) may reduce the 
opportunity for such insight. It is thought that such ‘knee-jerk’ regulatory responses to 
emotional arousal may be a factor that drives emotional eating behavior (Ouwens et al., 
2009). In such cases, active inference does not lead to improved interoceptive accuracy, 
but instead maintains an error state. Indeed, overt active inference may require a masking 
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or abstraction of nuanced and rich interoceptive signals for the purpose of promoting a 
rapid behavioral response. 
It is not the authors’ goal to denigrate the importance of active inference in 
allowing human beings to flexibly and dynamically adapt to the world in which they are 
inextricably embodied. Many unexpected sensations do require ‘doing’, an active 
regulatory response, rather than simply ‘being’ with unexpected sensation (Williams, 
2008). Indeed the most adaptive behavior may come from iterative cycling between 
perceptual and active inferences. However, the use of active inference should come with 
an oft-unappreciated caveat: it seems inevitable that sensory granularity will be lost when 
one redirects attention away from the body towards response formulation. Sensory 
granularity here is understood as the ability to notice specific details of internal sensory 
experience such as subtle changes in sensation. We posit that granularity requires the 
capacity for sustained attention to sensation, or least the ability to flexibly shift back and 
forth between sensory monitoring and conceptual inference.  
Degradation of sensory granularity is an important tradeoff in shifting to a 
problem-solving, active inference mode of processing. In many cases, the ability to notice 
changes in hunger and satiety levels as one eats is adaptive, empowering feelings of 
satiety to terminate the eating response and maintain homeostatic energy balance. 
Conversely, in our example above, realization that a sense of restlessness was not 
alleviated by food consumption is likewise important for ruling out eating as an 
appropriate regulatory strategy. A failure to return to interoceptive sensation following 
active inference can be seen as a fixation with a mode of ‘doing’ rather than ‘being’. 
Such fixation may promote continuation of food intake and potentially disrupt 
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homeostatic energy balances if hedonic eating drives are chronic (Lowe and Butryn, 
2007). If one is able to respond to unexpected sensation through perceptual rather than 
overt active inference, the motivational importance of even powerful interoceptive 
signals may be mitigated, allowing for deeper inquiry and reflection into the conditioning 
underlying the interoceptive signal. In modern secular culture, it has been argued that the 
balance between ‘being’ and ‘doing’ has been skewed towards the ‘doing’ mode; it may 
therefore take work to rebalance regulatory dynamics to optimize one’s regulatory 
potential (Williams, 2008). Affording a transition from ‘doing’ to ‘being is consequently 
a primary aim of interventions such a Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (Segal et al., 
2012). 
In summary, the integration of active and perceptual inference in the predictive 
coding model allows for the shared influence of secular and contemplative traditions in 
accounting for how body sensation are regulated. The idea of overt active inference fits 
well with the existing scientific literature- the idea that we are the curators of our bodies, 
needing to regulate interoceptive perturbation. Active inference can serve a variety of 
ends, be they allostatic, aiming to restore the body to its homeostatic baseline (Craig, 
2009; Gu and Fitzgerald, 2014), hedonic, aiming to achieve some desired pleasurable, 
energetic or tranquil state (Kringelbach, 2005; Paulus et al., 2009; Naqvi and Bechara, 
2010), or even nihilistic, aiming for freedom from sensation altogether, as is found in 
placebo-based analgesia (Büchel et al., 2014). Perceptual inference, by contrast is often 
less specified in discussions of adaptive self-regulation.  
A greater understanding of the mechanisms underlying perceptual inference is 
important, because high sensory precision weighting may be one avenue by which to 
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effect change in habitual regulatory behavior. Indeed, high levels of sensory granularity 
may be critical in challenging interpretive biases during the translation of concrete, 
granular levels of the simulation map into more gross or abstract levels of representation. 
Through attention to unelaborated emotional or physical sensation, a person may discover 
significant levels of tension and/or psychological distress associated with the body that 
were not previously in awareness, revealing a need for greater self-care (Price, 2005; 
Price et al., 2012a; Price et al., 2013). Conversely, interoceptive attention may reveal that 
an allostatic habit such as self-medication is not always necessary in the face of noxious 
interoceptive sensation (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1985). Recent research suggests that the brains 
of experienced meditators demonstrate reduced prediction errors to passively viewed 
rewards (Kirk and Montague, 2015), indicative of less clinging or attachment to positive 
outcomes that may serve as a basis for addictive behavior. Constructively, perceptual 
inference may also make people aware of inner resources, affording access to previously 
hidden capacities for calm, contentment, and appraisals that things are going well just as 
they are. In this way, every moment requires a choice between perceptual and active 
inference. And yet, how does a person know which information to use or whether he or 
she has enough information to act adaptively in response to their goals? When should one 
switch from perceptual to active inference? The ability to respond appropriately to 
interoceptive perturbation is a challenging problem that can serve to determine a person’s 
sense of well-being across the lifespan. 
With respect to the relevance of contemplative practice, a final point warrants 
mention surrounding the accessibility of active and perceptual inference. While ideally 
we are presented with a choice between the two error-minimizing responses, often this is 
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not the case. While active inference appears to be a ubiquitous, evolutionarily-conserved 
regulatory strategy (McBride, 2012), reframing unexpected sensations as a perceptual 
problem may require the cultivation of attentional capacities, intentions, and attitudes that 
are less intuitive. Our bodies perform physiological active inference even before we are 
born (Moor, 1968), and learning to apply overt active inference in the form of clothing, 
feeding, and otherwise caring for ourselves is a complex but near-universal feature of 
childhood development. Perceptual inference at these early stages may not be possible 
given limited cognitive resources or maturity of perspective, and indeed it may be 
counter-productive to an individual’s mastery of over active inference responses. As we 
mature however, we realize that not all unexpected sensations can or be corrected, or that 
our habitual, reflexive corrective habits are actually maladaptive. While behavioral 
therapies address this problem by working to bring such overt active inference habits to 
awareness so that they may be fruitfully restructured, perceptual inference may require 
development of a qualitatively different skill set. Thus it is important to consider that 
active and perceptual inferences are not equally available, and that perceptual inference 
tends to be the less available of the two without specific types of learning experiences. 
 
3. Interoception in Health, Disease and Well-Being  
It has been proposed that mental representations of selfhood are based 
fundamentally on embodied sensory experience, supporting a sense of the self in the 
world that is crucial for interacting with the environment (Seth, 2013). From this 
perspective, greater accuracy of interoceptive self-representation promotes greater 
moment-by-moment adaptation, whereas dissociation from accurate representation can 
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lead to dysregulation. Accordingly, many contemporary health problems involve 
dysregulated interoceptive processes, including affective disorders (Paulus and Stein, 
2010), addiction (Naqvi and Bechara, 2010), eating disorders (Garner et al., 1983; 
Pollatos et al., 2008; Herbert and Pollatos, 2014), chronic pain (Schmidt et al., 1989), 
dissociative disorders (Hankin, 2012; Michal et al., 2014; Sedeño et al., 2014), post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Wald and Taylor, 2008), and somatoform disorders 
(Mirams et al., 2012; Schaefer et al., 2012). Understanding how interoceptive processes 
influence representations of the self in the world and self-regulation may lead to 
improved disease and treatment models (Pollatos et al., 2005). 
3.1. Presence and Agency  
One approach to understanding dysfunctions in interoceptive awareness is to 
apply the predictive coding framework as an explanatory model distinguishing adaptive 
and maladaptive processing. Towards this end, two extensions of the model have been 
proposed, describing how inference processes outlined above operate to minimize 
prediction error (Seth et al., 2011). The first of these concepts is presence: presence is 
thought to arise when interoceptive and/or exteroceptive prediction error signals are 
successfully minimized. In Seth et al.’s account, such error minimization has been 
attributed to either overt or physiological active inference; as one successfully resolves 
unexpected sensation through autonomic or behavioral responses, a feeling of 
engagement and connection with one’s body and environment ensues. However, we 
propose that, from a contemplative perspective, presence is accessible through perceptual 
inference as well.  
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There are several ways that prediction errors may be reduced to give rise to 
presence: in a virtual reality environment, interoceptive signals may be successfully 
masked by salient external signals, such as seeing oneself walking in the absence of 
proprioceptive motion signals, leading to a sense of presence through acceptance of the 
external signal as one’s own embodied state. Given predictable and salient external cues 
in a virtual reality environment, a sense of presence may come more easily than trying to 
detect and match faint and chaotic interoceptive cues within the noisy internal milieu. By 
contrast, in contemplative practice the sense of presence through a variety of visceral 
experiences may broaden the distribution of interoceptive expectations (priors), reducing 
the precision of those priors and thereby minimizing the potential for prediction error. In 
other words, in a simulation map that allows for great variation in sensory inputs, 
relatively few visceral sensations are extreme enough to create a prediction error 
demanding a regulatory response.  
We suggest that with successful iterations of perceptual inference, the influence of 
prior expectations is thereby weakened, leading to feelings of automatic simulation map 
updating: effortless presence (Sjölie, 2014). While healthy individuals likely experience 
such effortless presence as a matter of course, it is likely that such experiences operate 
across a continuum of effort, with extreme difficulties in achieving presence manifesting 
as depersonalization and derealization disorders (Seth et al., 2011). However, even within 
the healthy population, the degree to which presence is experienced and maintained may 
be dependent upon regulatory strategies and habits. A person whose regulatory habit is 
overt active inference may spend a great deal of time pursuing idealized interoceptive 
states, rather than learning to allow autonomic regulation to more subtly achieve and 
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maintain such states. Such a person would require greater effort to achieve feelings of 
presence. Furthermore, a reliance on active inference in general may reduce the 
possibility for presence when a sensation cannot be easily mapped to an active regulatory 
pathway, be it through overt behavior or autonomic regulation. In such situations, 
effortless presence may seem like an important but unachievable state, similar to the ideal 
of accepting one’s negative thoughts and feelings for individuals with a history of 
depression or anxiety (Pauley and McPherson, 2010). For such individuals, learning to 
reduce prediction error through perceptual rather than active inference may constitute a 
radical shift in self-processing, the introduction of a new regulation strategy based on 
acceptance rather than control. It is unknown how variable feelings of presence are in the 
general population; but we would hypothesize that effortless experiences of presence are 
fleeting at best in the frenetic, “what’s next”-paced endemic of modern Western culture. 
As an example of presence functioning adaptively, one might imagine the 
perception and then acceptance of an unexpected, transient increase in heart rate. 
Following the initial upset, a person may engage in perceptual inference, exploring the 
interoceptive signal, which we operationalize as an attempt to update the simulation map 
to match this signal. Acceptance would then occur when perceptual inference 
successfully simulates the elevated heart rate as the normal, expected state. By accepting 
the internal change, the motivational force of the physiological change is minimized 
without requiring the suppression of either expectations or interoceptive signals. By 
contrast, the use of overt active inference to resolve unexpected events has been 
associated with the sense of agency (Seth et al., 2011), a feeling of control over one’s 
actions in the world, that one can act to produce particular results. Agency can be 
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inspired both by direct regulation of bodily sensation, as well as through changes in 
behavioral patterns that indirectly contribute to one’s interoceptive state. In the context of 
our discussion of interoception and well-being, the sense of agency is important for 
supporting a sense of responsibility for self-regulation. This applies both to conventional 
forms of overt active inference, such as quitting a stressful job and going for a less paid 
but more livable employment, but also to contemplative practices such as learning that 
one can reduce feelings of anxious arousal through breath monitoring or other regulatory 
activities. 
Presence and agency are important in that they establish norms for experience and 
control that guide behavior and ultimately determine one’s sense of well-being. In 
anxiety disorders, for instance, agency is achieved through withdrawal from stressful 
situations, a form of active inference that is effective in the short term but ultimately 
maladaptive, as that person never learns that the feared outcome is unlikely to be true. In 
anxiety, prediction errors are augmented- a person may experience a strongly aversive 
response to a previously neutral stimulus (Paulus and Stein, 2006). This aversive 
response is then augmented rather than extinguished when the anxious individual makes 
catastrophic appraisals of the aversive sensation that are paired with active inferences to 
manage these perceived catastrophes. For example, if a racing heartbeat during exercise 
is appraised as a heart attack, active inference requires a trip to the hospital. If rapid 
breathing prior to public speaking is appraised as lack of ability that will lead to 
embarrassment, active inference requires social withdrawal. Faced with threats to agency, 
maladaptive behaviors are reinforced, which ultimately interferes with exploration and 
modification of one’s relationship to stressful events. From a predictive coding model, 
 
 
Interoception, Contemplative Practice, and Health 39 
chronic stress may lead to a reduction in the precision of prediction error coding in favor 
of strong priors around the recognition of aversive sensation and confirmatory active 
inference behaviors to alleviate that sensation. While it is unpleasant to experience 
unexpected aversive arousal, it is this secondary appraisal around agency, the threat to 
control over the situation that is the cause of deep distress. The idea that higher order 
constructs such as agency are at the heart of subjective well-being is a central theme of 
modern appraisal theory (Scherer et al., 2001), just as presence lies at the heart of 
contemplative accounts of well-being (Brown and Ryan, 2003). These theories serve to 
reinforce the point that subjective mental health stems from our inferences about coping 
capacity, for which each attempt at perceptual or active inference serves as a momentary 
test. If imprecise prediction errors prompt inefficient or maladaptive active inference 
behaviors, inferences of coping failure are likely, exacerbating feelings of powerless and 
inefficacy and contributing to the deleterious impact of the stressor. 
In its ability to link higher order appraisals of self-worth to momentary regulatory 
acts, the predictive coding framework is helpful in understanding many other disorders, 
because it suggests that well-being requires active sustenance, i.e., that presence and 
agency must be continuously constructed through successful reduction of prediction error 
(Paulus, 2007), regardless of the balance between active or perceptual inference. This 
perspective stands in contrast to notions that isolation from our bodies and the world is 
preferential except to alert us about negative events. Instead, it is the lack of integration 
of accurate interoceptive simulations into higher order representations that is 
hypothesized to underlie dysregulated cognition and behavior. In this observation there is 
considerable convergence with contemplative perspectives. For example, following 
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trauma, some individuals may experience dissociation from bodily experience, as is 
found in some forms of severe depression and PTSD (Feeny et al., 2000). In such cases, 
the priors associated with body error signals may have been linked to traumatic 
experiences, which are too powerful to be actively controlled (active inference), and too 
aversive to be accepted or, as in many contemplative orientations, altered simply by 
being observed (both instances of perceptual inference). Since the error signals cannot be 
minimized, the simulation map itself may be suppressed in the form of experiential 
avoidance, a form of protective habituation to powerful and uncontrollable interoceptive 
signals, or behavioral avoidance of provocative situations altogether. Such inhibition 
may amount to a reduction of the precision of priors in the map, so that only very 
powerful sensory signals are able to trigger an upward flow of prediction errors towards 
higher simulation layers. While avoidance provides momentary relief from the attentional 
pull of prediction error signals, inhibition of interoceptive awareness may also create its 
own host of psychosocial issues, both through the obfuscation of important interoceptive 
cues, the absence of desirable interoceptive sensations, and the maintenance of 
dysfunctional beliefs about the world and their relation to it (Paulus and Stein, 2010). 
Indeed, the severity of somatic dissociation has been linked to greater susceptibility to 
experimentally-induced somatic illusions, suggesting an over-reliance on prior 
knowledge that interferes with current sensory input (McKenzie and Newport, 2015). 
Many contemplative traditions begin from the assumption that a suffering individual’s 
interoceptive integration may be dysfunctional or deficient; to rectify this situation, 
attention to the body may delay cognitive appraisal, creating space to restructure the 
integration process (Shapiro et al., 2008). 
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3.2. Interoceptive Training in Clinical Practice 
Specific examples of dysfunctional interoceptive integration are myriad in 
psychological disorders. For instance, when an individual with severe attachment 
disturbances considers close social interaction, there is often an immediate discrepancy 
between expected and actual feelings of connectedness, providing a new source of 
interoceptive surprise that may be anxiously appraised (Rector et al., 2006; Gilbert et al., 
2012). Similarly, it is not uncommon for a person with a severe history of trauma to be so 
anxious that it is not possible to experience the positive sensations of close interactions 
(Fogel, 2009; Frewen et al., 2012). In the absence of new interoceptive information, such 
fears and concerns may take on the quality of rumination, perseverative thinking that is 
associated with affective disorder vulnerability (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). The predictive 
coding framework provides an explanation for how rumination can dominate attention: 
when simulation maps operate with low perceptual weighting, attention is more often 
drawn to active regulation, leaving little opportunity for experiences of interoceptive 
presence, a feeling that a sensation is acceptable and tolerable, that may challenge 
sustained bleak and dysphoric expectations. Contemplative training is largely oriented to 
increasing one’s capacity to de-habituate such coding. Commonly, such cognitive 
distortions of reality may continue unfettered, leading to a downward spiral that 
characterizes the chronic and recurrent nature of affective disorders (Raes et al., 2008).  
And yet, despite the importance of perceptual inference for well-being, we should 
stress that such inference alone is not a panacea. Perceptual experience is not easily 
divorced from subsequent appraisal, and so even accurate and precise interoception may 
activate powerfully-conditioned negative associations and appraisals (Treleaven, 2009). 
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For example, in anorexia nervosa, patients may possess powerful associations between 
awareness of bodily states associated with starvation and a ‘doing’ mode that focuses on 
the control of eating, shape and weight, ultimately culminating in interoceptive 
suppression once more (Watts et al., 2007; Park et al., 2011). In anorexia, bringing 
awareness to the body will initially be met with an increase rather than decrease in 
maladaptive behavior. Thus there is a reason that interoception becomes disrupted, and 
skillful guidance is particularly important in restoring interoceptive access.  
If a regulatory framework is not in place, such as the capacity for acceptance of 
ambiguous or challenging sensations, restoring interoceptive access- or advocating 
contemplative intervention- could introduce new trauma. For example, enhancing 
interoceptive awareness without compensatory regulation may be maladaptive to a 
severely depressed and suicidal individual or someone with acute pain from a severe 
burn. In many cases however, it seems that specifically trained, skillful clinical or 
contemplative guidance can successfully address the challenges inherent to interoceptive 
re-engagement. For example, research with women in treatment for substance use 
disorder suggests that when they are encouraged to discover the connection between 
physiological and emotional distress, they often learn that they have the capacity and 
skills to attend and negotiate emotional stress. Enhanced interoceptive awareness 
provides nuanced cues for self-care that facilitate emotion regulation, reducing 
conditioned substance-use responses to stress, and allowing such patients to maintain 
sobriety (Bowen et al., 2007; Price et al., 2012b).  
The need for a skillful interpretive framework is apparent in psychometric 
research on mindfulness of body sensation, such as the ‘observe’ facet of the five-factor 
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mindfulness questionnaire (Baer et al., 2008). This research on the questionnaire suggests 
that high levels of this ‘observe’ facet are associated with mixed health outcomes in the 
general population, but with more uniformly positive outcomes in those who are 
relatively trauma-free and have received a background in contemplative training. A 
recently published report pointed out that the commonly assessed ‘observe’ facet, 
becoming aware of bodily changes, may change with these approaches to a much smaller 
degree than the regulatory aspects of interoceptive awareness, that is, how the body is 
used for self-regulation in daily life (Bornemann et al., 2014). In this case, a 
multidimensional self-report measure was sufficient for distinguishing between aspects of 
interoceptive change, and serves as an important precedent for further clinical research. It 
should be noted however that the bulk of the clinical research discussed in the following 
section has employed only more global qualitative reports of interoceptive change, a 
finding which may in fact be driven by training effects on only a subset of interoception's 
many facets. 
3.3. Clinical Examples in Patients with PTSD or Chronic Pain  
To clarify the relevance of interoception in the promotion of well-being, it may be 
useful to consider examples where the cultivation of adaptive interoception has yielded 
clinical success. Emerging research suggests that contemplative practices may powerfully 
support the process of interoceptive re-discovery. In the treatment of women with a 
history of interpersonal sexual violence, participants learn to engage in perceptual 
inference, recognizing when sensory cues of dissociation are triggered emotionally, 
allowing them to maintain awareness of their bodies instead of dissociating from those 
sensations into habitual, active regulatory responses. Over time, participants discover that 
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their bodies can be a helpful informative resource rather than a source of threat signals 
that should be avoided. Thus, body sensations not previously incorporated into awareness 
can be allowed into phenomenological experience, and can be more appropriately 
integrated into self-schemas. These experiences can lead to a greater sense of safety in 
the world, greater ability to engage in intimate interactions with spouse/partner without 
dissociating, greater ability to negotiate stressful environments and interactions, and 
lastly a greater sense of wholeness and empowerment (Price, 2005; 2007). It remains to 
be determined whether these contemplative practices increase interoceptive accuracy 
directly, or instead support other elements of our interoceptive taxonomy, such as 
increasing sensitivity to interoceptive events and moderating subsequent regulatory 
habits. 
A further example of contemplative practices’ potential lies in the psychological 
management of chronic pain, in which the most commonly applied approach is currently 
a combination of cognitive reframing by cognitive behavioral therapy and attentional 
distraction (Hoffman et al., 2007). Recently, however, it has been questioned whether 
distraction works for chronic pain as well as it does for acute experimental pain (Goubert 
et al., 2004). One reason for reconsidering distraction techniques is that part of chronic 
pain pathology may actually revolve around maladaptive fear associations that 
impoverish interoceptive processing and exacerbate pain syndromes, conditioned 
withdrawal associations which distraction would only serve to reinforce rather than 
challenge (Zaman et al., 2015). Instead, “interoceptive exposure” may be an alternative 
(Craske et al., 1997; Boswell et al., 2013). Yoga includes interoceptive training, is 
associated with decreased prefrontal brain activity and has shown benefits for pain 
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management (Villemure et al., 2013). Keeping in mind concerns that interoceptive 
awareness is not always beneficial, helpful, or tolerable, it would seem that these and 
other examples suggest that in many cases, careful guidance of attention, informed by 
contemplative theory, and with case-sensitive guidance, may allow people to reconnect 
with their bodies with great therapeutic potential. With appropriate support, patients may 
learn to tolerate negatively conditioned experiences of the body, eventually accepting 
their prepotent aversive responses, which frees cognitive resources for reconstruction of 
the appraisal process (Park et al., 2012). 
In summary, interoception is important for well-being, at a pragmatic level of 
maintaining desired physiological states within the body, but also at an epistemic level 
for its contributions to perceptions of presence and agency. Indeed, many psychological 
disorders are characterized by disruptions to presence and agency in the form of 
dissociation or hopelessness, or by maladaptive solutions to agency violations, as is found 
in anxious withdrawal. Contemplative training may be effective to restore adaptive 
interoceptive dynamics that address these violations, keeping in mind the caveat that the 
reframing of interoceptive signals must be carried out with care and support to increase 
tolerance for aversively-conditioned sensation. How such practices may accomplish this 
restorative feat is the topic of the next section. 
4. Contemplative Practices for Revitalizing Interoception: the Example of 
Mindfulness 
Given compelling evidence that interoceptive processes are integral to many 
forms of affective and related disorders, we might ask how interoception can be restored 
to an optimal state. Clinical experience suggests that trusting in body signals as 
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potentially decision-guiding information and valuing the body as an important resource in 
directing one’s behavior may be key conditional precursors for this change (Mehling et 
al., 2011). In the predictive coding framework, trust or acceptance of interoceptive 
signals fits with our discussion of increased sensory weighting, perceptual inference and 
the cultivation of feelings of presence. While modern scientific traditions have much to 
say about the mechanics of the body, how such mechanics can be used to cultivate a more 
embodied phenomenological state has not historically been a focus of these traditions. It 
is in this effort to understand the cultivation and sustenance of presence and agency that 
contemplative science may be of value.  
Many body-based contemplative practices involve explicit direction of attention 
to interoceptive sensations. The exploration of interoceptive awareness under many other 
names is central to Asian contemplative, medical, and philosophical traditions. 
Importantly, these are presented in a philosophical context of exploring errors about the 
self and individual subjectivity that result in part from ignoring, misinterpreting, or 
missing more subtle levels of an individual’s interoceptive experience. Such 
contemplative practices, although they may have numerous other goals in addition to 
training interoceptive awareness, offer a method for training in such awareness and, in 
many cases, for reorienting experience from, for example, distraction to attentional 
control, effort to ease, separateness to connection. All these shifts are deemed beneficial. 
In this section, we will focus on mindfulness meditation traditions as they contribute to a 
sense of presence through largely stationary interoceptive attention practices. It is 
however important to note that other, movement-based traditions such as yoga or tai chi 
may be especially well-suited towards the cultivation of agency. A great deal of research 
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is needed to explore the effects of particular practices on the predictive coding of bodily 
awareness. 
Among contemplative traditions, mindfulness has recently received a particularly 
strong representation in modern sciences. There is an extensive literature on the health 
benefits of mindfulness approaches- for overviews see (Grossman et al., 2004; Chiesa 
and Serretti, 2009; Hofmann et al., 2010), particularly in the area of preventing relapse in 
those vulnerable to depression (Goyal et al., 2014). It should be noted that interoceptive 
training is only one aspect of mindfulness interventions, which also emphasize changing 
one’s relationship to thought content. Nonetheless, such interventions may represent the 
most prominent introduction of interoceptive training in the West. Mindfulness 
approaches may be particularly efficacious in reducing somatic dissociation from chronic 
pain and sexual trauma (Price, 2007) but also in other mental health disorders such as 
substance use (Price et al., 2012b) depression (Williams et al., 2013), anxiety (Hoge et 
al., 2013) and eating dysregulation (Daubenmier et al., 2011). There are suggestions that 
interoceptive mindfulness practices yield changes across a variety of cognitive domains, 
including self-reference (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Farb et al., 2007; Ingram et al., 2011), 
attention (Jha et al., 2007; De Raedt and Koster, 2010), emotion regulation (Ortner et al., 
2007; Jha et al., 2010), pain perception (Zeidan et al., 2010a; Gard et al., 2012), agency 
(Allen et al., 2009), and feelings of social connectedness (Hutcherson et al., 2008; Neff 
and Germer, 2013); see (Holzel et al., 2011)for an integrative review).  
Modern scientific definitions conceptualize mindfulness as an open, engaged, and 
non-judgmental awareness of the ongoing flux of present moment experience, including 
internal experiences of sensations, thoughts, and feelings, as well as exteroceptive 
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sensations. It has been argued that one of the primary and early means by which 
mindfulness benefits its practitioners is by anchoring attention to interoceptive signals 
such as the breath or body sensation (Mehling et al., 2011; Kerr et al., 2013; Farb et al., 
2014), an idea supported by training-related reports of both increased subjective body 
awareness (Mehling, 2001) and increased strength of brain networks dedicated to 
interoceptive processing (Farb et al., 2013). Focal attention to bodily sensations is at least 
one method by which mindfulness training shapes cognition (Hölzel et al., 2011); with 
stability of interoceptive anchoring, practitioners also engage in open monitoring of 
experience, which, from the modern secular perspective of using contemplative practice 
for therapeutic effects, reveals and weakens maladaptive reactive patterns so that they 
may be adaptively modified (Lutz et al., 2008; van den Hurk et al., 2010). From a 
predictive coding framework, body-focused contemplative practices may alter 
interoceptive processing by shifting regulatory habits from active to perceptual inference, 
increasing bottom-up integration of what is happening in the body rather than attempting 
to alter body sensation to fit top-down expectations of what should happen in the body 
(Pagnoni and Porro, 2014).  Since even low level perceptions of interoceptive sensations 
commonly rely on the integration of both sensory and expectation processes, engaging in 
a contemplative interoceptive practice may reduce the precision of prior expectations, 
reducing the ability of priors to trigger prediction errors in response to incoming 
sensations. The consequence of this widening of acceptable sensory inputs may therefore 
allow for more accurate and dynamic representations of sensation, yielding more nuanced 
and adaptive behavioral responses.  
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The wealth of empirical studies on mindfulness training mechanisms makes it a 
useful starting point in discussing how contemplative practices may impact interoceptive 
processing. Below, we describe several domains in which contemplative traditions such 
as mindfulness may positively impact interoceptive processing, acknowledging that these 
domains likely interact and support each other in an iterative and dynamic (rather than 
linear) manner. 
4.1. Enhanced Sensitivity  
Contrary to the perceptions of even experienced meditators, mindfulness does not 
appear to generally increase interoceptive sensitivity when assessed in laboratory 
settings, at least where the most popular metrics of interoceptive accuracy, heartbeat 
perception, is concerned (Khalsa et al., 2008; Parkin et al., 2013). Mindfulness may 
however increase interoceptive sensitivity in domains that are the foci of meditative 
practice, such as sensation of the breath (Daubenmier et al., 2013), or interoceptive cues 
indicating the presence of subtle reactive patterns. Even brief body-scan meditations 
reduce errors in a subtle somatic signal detection task (Mirams et al., 2013), similar to the 
enhanced tactile acuity related to movement-based tai chi practices (Kerr et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, mindfulness training appears to alter interoceptive attention tendencies, 
focusing attention on interoceptive sensations rather than cognitive appraisals of such 
sensations (Garland et al., 2012), in keeping with a model in which contemplative 
practices shifts regulatory strategy from active to perceptual inference. As such, 
sensitivity enhancements following mindfulness training may constitute a kind of 
‘embodied ethic’ that promotes interoceptive attention deployment, a daily commitment 
to perceptual inference rather than an enhancement of sensitivity itself (Grossman, 2015).  
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One consequence of increased perceptual inference is increased granularity of 
interoceptive experience, reducing the self-appraised emotional impact of experience in 
favor of enhanced clarity and sensitivity to subtle emotion provocation (Nielsen and 
Kaszniak, 2006). Such sensitivity may manifest at multiple levels of the simulation map, 
allowing practitioners to recognize subtle, temporally extended dynamics of 
physiological arousal, dynamics that would ordinarily be obfuscated by definitive 
cognitive appraisals in response to early perturbations. The benefit of enhanced 
granularity is an opportunity to learn more about one’s body and its conditioning in the 
world. Indeed, mindfulness practitioners show increased accuracy between subjective and 
objective measures of body sensitivity, an index of the relative sensitivity to different 
body regions (Fox et al., 2012), and increased coherence between physiological and 
subjective states (Sze et al., 2010). Such coherence allows for greater appreciation of how 
stressful situations impact both mind and body, increasing the chances of adaptive 
regulatory action. Furthermore, because interoception engages the same neural pathways 
supporting pro-social emotions such as empathy (Singer et al., 2009), increased 
interoceptive sensitivity may also lead to improved social function, although direct 
evidence for this relationship is still needed. 
4.2. Enhanced Non-Reactivity 
 The deeper benefits of contemplative practices lie in leveraging non-reactivity to 
generate adaptive regulatory insights. The predictive-coding model can account for the 
availability of such insights through the idea of precision weighting, i.e., how much a 
person divides finite metabolic and attentional resources between i) representing, 
exploring, and accepting unexpected sensory signals, i.e., prediction errors, and ii) 
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maintaining prior expectations. As discussed, attention can lead to greater precision 
weighting of sensation over priors, which in turn promotes perceptual as opposed to overt 
active inference (Figure 1). Both perceptual and overt active inferences require the use of 
metabolic resources, as evidenced by the feelings of effort when one first engages in 
either process. However, only overt active inference engages cognitive elaboration, 
requiring cognitive appraisal of the many action affordances available in response to 
interoceptive perturbations. Given that overt active inference is likely to consume 
considerably greater metabolic resources, individuals must attempt to optimize the 
precision of incoming sensory data and priors to minimize wasted regulatory effort 
(Fotopoulou, 2013). Unfortunately, for individuals with strongly conditioned regulatory 
tendencies, i.e. highly precise tuning of priors, this minimization may prove difficult in 
the face of seemingly automatic and obligatory regulatory responses. Resolving the 
disconnection between the ideal of regulatory efficiency and the reality of conditioned 
active inference is a non-trivial problem. 
We hypothesize that one major benefit of contemplative interoceptive practice is 
that it provides a pathway towards perceptual inference in the face of such conditioning, 
effectively relaxing appraisal tendencies. While still demanding attention, perceptual 
inference frees higher order cognition to arise and pass without particular attachment to a 
given appraisal of the simulated state. In other words, perceptual inference frees higher 
order resources to allow metacognition, representation of the mind’s current state. The 
simple act of observation itself, as mentioned, can create a shift, possibly even without 
setting in motion higher-order resources. The idea that one’s thoughts can be viewed as 
transient mental events rather than as cues to immediate action is often referred to as 
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decentering or reperceiving in the mindfulness literature (Shapiro et al., 2006; Fresco et 
al., 2007), and may be an adaptive consequence of responding to arousing experiences 
using perceptual rather than active inference. Decentering may also be related to the 
intentional arc, which sets mindfulness practice in motion and sustains it. Mindfulness 
training seems particularly well-suited for promoting decentering relative to progressive 
muscle relaxation or loving kindness interventions (Feldman et al., 2010), perhaps due to 
the explicit enhancement of sensory precision weighting at the expense of active 
inference. Such decentering may not be an end unto itself, but also afford flexible ‘re-
centering’ on habitually ignored sensations that constitute meaningful, constructive and 
positive experiences. Accordingly, mindfulness experience has been associated with 
increased cognitive flexibility (Moore and Malinowski, 2009). In this way, dedicated 
perceptual processing of interoceptive signals may serve to enhance conceptual non-
reactivity to experience that in turn promotes well-being.  
4.3. Enhanced Regulation 
In the metacognitive space that is afforded by enhanced non-reactivity, multiple 
interoceptive appraisals may be observed as arising and passing. From a decentered 
perspective, a person may become aware both of her most prepotent, i.e., frequently and 
powerfully occurring, appraisal tendencies, but also of alternative appraisal options. From 
awareness of multiple options, flexibility of choice can be directly experienced, thereby 
allowing for novel, creative and potentially more adaptive appraisals and actions over 
time. As an example, a person in a stressful public speaking situation may use mindful 
attention to notice her elevated physiological response. From this perspective, appraisals 
of threat and incompetence may rapidly arise, but with continued attention towards 
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sensory perception, such appraisals may also pass, interspersed with weaker, and less 
frequent appraisals of potential failure, support from loved ones, and feelings of 
determination. With this greater tableau of appraisals before her, the speaker may elect to 
appraise her arousal as a surmountable challenge rather than an imminent threat that 
requires withdrawal from the situation. It is through this process of forming insight that 
interoceptive attention may iteratively shift engagement away from habitual appraisals to 
promote experiences of insight and choice. 
With practice, iterations of weighting attention towards perceptual inference may 
allow an individual to more permanently decondition and eventually replace appraisals of 
environmental stressors as threat with exploration of such stressors, appraising them 
instead as challenges to be explored, a distinction with important consequences for 
reducing physiological stress (Tomaka et al., 1993). Over time, this process of 
overcoming habitual dysphoric or catastrophic appraisals in favor of a less rigidly 
deterministic simulation map may result in positive trajectories for transformation, 
upward spirals in the promotion of well-being (Garland et al., 2010; Garland et al., 2011). 
One example of adaptive sensory precision weighting in mindfulness can be 
found in a study of pain perception. Pain perception is theorized to have both a sensory 
component, representing the intensity and location of the interoceptive signal, and an 
affective component, representing the signal’s motivational relevance in term of 
pleasantness or unpleasantness (Melzack, 1975), an distinction supported by 
neuroimaging research (Tölle et al., 1999). In one recent study (Farb et al., 2013), 
mindful attention in experienced meditators was associated with increased attention to 
bottom-up signals as reflected in increased posterior insula activation, a region of primary 
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interoceptive representation (Craig, 2002; Farb et al., 2012b), but decreased top-down 
processing as reflected in decreased lateral prefrontal cortical activity, a region involved 
in cognitive appraisal (Ochsner et al., 2004). These neural changes were linked to a 
change in the pain experience, such that pain was perceived as similarly intense but less 
unpleasant during a state of mindful attention. In the absence of cognitive judgment, 
cognition may be freed to consider alternative interpretations of sensory states. From a 
regulatory perspective, such freedom allows an individual to explore different forms of 
active inference, and may perhaps even reveal that active regulation of interoceptive 
signals is no longer necessary. 
4.4. Enhanced Insight  
While perceptual inference, by definition precludes immediate cognitive 
elaboration on sensation, in the long term, a greater corpus of interoceptive information 
provides a richer set of data from which to investigate habitual sources of interoceptive 
perturbation, to identify the relationship between inner somatic experience and cognitive 
experience, and one’s internal responses to outside events and stimuli. This meta-
cognitive awareness may lead to insight, recognition of how events, emotions, thoughts 
and bodily sensations relate to each other (Lavie et al., 2003; Sze et al., 2010). For 
example, recent studies in body ownership show that a sense of one’s body can be 
manipulated by experimentally-induced visual and tactile feedback (Ainley et al., 2013; 
Suzuki et al., 2013) but those with greater interoceptive accuracy (as assessed by 
heartbeat detection) are less susceptible to illusions of body-ownership (Tsakiris et al., 
2011). This ‘rubber hand illusion’ is a good example of prioritizing attention towards 
priors for the interpretation of visual input over attention towards prediction errors 
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stemming from afferent interoceptive signals from the hand. For insight to occur one 
need not have perfect accuracy in such interoceptive signal representation; however, 
insight could emerge as a process of weighting sensory prediction errors over priors, 
leading to a higher-fidelity simulation of body state. In theory, contemplative practices 
could similarly reduce false inferences about the relationship between one’s body and the 
world.  
As interoceptive signals inform emotional experience, contemplative practice may 
promote a cycle of awareness of the contingencies between environmental triggers, 
bodily responses, cognitive appraisals and emotional experiences, knowledge which can 
then be leveraged to regulate cognition and behavior in the service of emotional well-
being. We argue that this process optimally occurs when interoception is viewed as 
foundational to emotional experience, and thus interoceptive attention becomes a basis 
for engaging in emotional processing, enhancing awareness and regulation of rapidly 
escalating emotional responses to stress. For example, in a study for women in substance 
use disorder treatment, those taught interoceptive awareness and related skills for self-
care perceived such awareness as facilitating their ability to identify, accept and process 
their emotions, key regulating factors that they attributed to successfully preventing 
relapse to substance use (Price et al., 2012a). Through these introspective cycles, insight 
is fostered that radically modifies inference of interoceptive signals, towards perceptual 
over active inference, exploring causal factors rather than requiring an immediate 
inference and response to interoceptive causality. Despite such enticing claims, more 
research is needed to substantiate the idea that mindfulness practice helps to alter the 
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extent to which particular interoceptive signals are attended to and received with finer 
granularity in daily life. 
4.5. Enhanced Presence and Agency 
If the link between perceptual inference and insight can be empirically validated, 
there are many downstream benefits that may ensue. For example, mindfulness’ ability to 
curtail habitual reactive tendencies may enhance one’s sense of presence and agency, and 
indeed mindfulness training has been associated with increased motor control during 
perceptual-motor conflicts (Teper and Inzlicht, 2013). Enhanced perceptual-motor 
integration reflecting increased agency may impact self-representations related to one’s 
ability to control the environment, which may have important consequences for one’s 
sense of well-being. Minimally, the increased weighting of interoceptive signal may 
increase interoceptive accuracy, decreasing the impact of dysfunctional simulations and 
self-representations on cognitive and behavior, as previously proposed (Farb et al., 
2012a). For example, depression is characterized by external locus of control, learned 
helplessness, and low self-efficacy, and some evidence suggests depressed people have 
poorer interoceptive accuracy (Ehlers and Breuer, 1992; Pollatos et al., 2009) (Pessoa and 
Ungerleider, 2004; Dunn et al., 2007; Pollatos et al., 2009), whereas mindfulness training 
appears to bolster self-efficacy (Chang et al., 2004). Furthermore, mindfulness training 
has been associated with normalization of the gait pattern of depressed individuals, 
suggesting concurrent changes in proprioceptive and emotional responses (Michalak et 
al., 2011). Presence and agency appears to matter for physiological self-regulation: the 
rubber hand illusion, in which visual-tactile illusions decrease a sense of ownership over 
one’s arm, results in decreased skin perfusion and temperature (Moseley et al., 2008), and 
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increased stress hormone release in that arm (Barnsley et al., 2011), without providing 
commensurate pain relief in that arm (Mohan et al., 2012). These findings suggest that a 
strategy for minimizing interoceptive prediction errors through substitution of 
interoceptive inputs with exteroceptive inputs leads to dysfunctional, and, in the long run, 
unhealthy physiological changes in the respective bodily region. Conversely, we would 
hypothesize that minimization of interoceptive prediction error by increased precision 
weighting of sensation over priors may create a sense of embodied presence and be able 
to reverse such dysfunctional physiological changes.  
Over time, an increased sense of presence and agency may also begin to enhance 
higher order self-representations such as self-esteem. Through this process, a person may 
hold greater confidence in his engagement with interoceptive inference, which may in 
turn reinforce the exploratory cycling between perceptual and active inference, again 
promoting upward spirals in the promotion of well-being (Garland et al., 2010; Garland 
et al., 2011). It remains to be tested whether enhanced interoceptive attention may 
produce differential cognitive-emotional-physiological effects when placed in different 
parts of the body and contemplative theories may guide the formulation of such 
hypotheses. Future research could examine to what extent contemplative practices 
enhance a sense of presence or agency that can account for improvements in self-efficacy 
and related aspects of mental health. In particular, movement practices such as yoga and 
tai chi may more readily promote an increased sense of agency in which the opportunity 
to explore sensorimotor signals in slow, controlled movements is readily apparent.  
4.6. Increased Positive Experiences 
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Another downstream consequence of enhanced interoceptive capacity may be the 
ability to engage with and appreciate pleasant sensations. In the case of mindful eating 
interventions, for example, practices involve bringing greater attention to the pleasure of 
seeing, smelling, tasting, and eating of palatable foods and noticing when the satisfaction 
subsides, as taste-specific satiety mechanisms become apparent (Kristeller and Wolever, 
2010; Daubenmier et al., 2011). Indeed, many mindfulness training programs involve a 
raisin-eating exercise (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), in which increased sensory precision 
weighting is encouraged to decenter habitual interpretations of the consumptive act, 
replaced with re-centering on unexpected positive aspects of the experience. The ability 
to enter into such sensory states and appreciate positive sensations is important, because 
reduced response in the brain’s reward regions to consumption of palatable foods such as 
milkshakes is associated with increased, unwanted weight gain (Stice et al., 2010). Such 
reduced activation may account for the subjective experience of “chasing the flavor” and 
continued eating. It remains to be determined whether increased awareness of the 
pleasurable taste of palatable foods increases reward activation and ultimately reduces 
food consumption, in particular among those who are overweight. Similarly, 
mindfulness-based interventions during recovery from drug addiction appear to increase 
interoceptive responsiveness to natural rewards while decreasing responsiveness to drug 
cues, an effect correlated with reductions in drug craving (Garland et al., 2014). As 
interoceptive attention broadens to allow reactions to less conditioned cues, it appears 
that freedom from maladaptive cycles of craving may follow (Khanna and Greeson, 
2013). Furthermore, classical accounts of mindfulness training suggest that the continued 
exploration of experience, including interoceptive conditioning, can itself lead to feelings 
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of joy and rapture (Brewer et al., 2013); the importance of such feelings is made concrete 
in consideration of mindfulness’ impact in these and other clinical disorders. 
4.7. Embodied Effects  
Finally, it is important to note that because mindfulness practice itself takes place in 
an embodied context, engagement with interoceptive processes may promote further 
physiological effects. One example common to all Buddhist traditions is the importance 
of sitting posture in cultivating attentional stability and emotional equipoise. As 
traditionally stated in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition: “When the body is straight, the 
channels are straight, when the channels are straight, the energies are straight, when the 
energies are straight the mind is straight” (Rinpoche, 1998). An upright sitting posture is 
thought to affect the movement of energy through the channels thereby enhancing the 
effectiveness of the meditation practice. One could hypothesize that just sitting in this 
posture without engaging in a meditative practice may have beneficial effects. Upright 
postures are associated with enhanced physiological outcomes in hospital patients 
(Convertino, 2003). And indeed, sitting in an upright posture without actually engaging 
in meditation practice, referred to as “sham meditation”, is associated with slowed 
respiration rate which predicts decreased pain unpleasantness ratings (Zeidan et al., 
2010b). Another example is mindfulness meditation’s association with increased heart 
rate variability (HRV) (Ditto et al., 2006), particularly in the high frequency band, an 
indicator of parasympathetic activation (Wu and Lo, 2008; Krygier et al., 2013). Greater 
resting HRV is associated with a host of cognitive benefits, including greater sustained 
attention, working memory, and motor-response control (Thayer et al., 2009). Thus, as 
the mindfulness practice itself unfolds, mindful attention impacts physiological systems, 
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which in turn may feed back to influence cognitive processes in a self-reinforcing cycle. 
In other words, the process of attending to interoceptive sensations provides time for 
autonomic processes to restore homeostasis, rather than perpetuating inefficient or 
maladaptive regulatory habits that rely on overt behavioral intervention. Awareness of 
homeostasis may generate feelings of calm, peace, and satisfaction, greater connection to 
others, and a decreased desire to seek out externally rewarding stimuli to maintain a 
hedonic set point. Unlike external rewards, the reward of increasingly accurate perceptual 
predictions may be continuous. However, this is not to say that mindfulness meditation 
predisposes one to passive monitoring states, but such training may increase the ability to 
respond more adaptively to environmental challenges and return to homeostasis more 
quickly.  
Taken together, an interoceptive consequence of contemplative practice is the 
decoupling of hedonic stimulus response arcs, i.e., an increased capacity to refrain from 
automatically responding to aversion with avoidance and to pleasure with approach. This 
relative freedom from interoceptive appraisal habits that drive behavior may optimize 
homeostasis that becomes a self-reinforcing process. Thus, this model may serve as a 
working hypothesis for the mechanisms of action underlying how changes in 
interoceptive awareness resulting from contemplative practice may enhance health and 
well-being including affective and dissociative disorders, pain, and addiction. Research is 
needed to better understand what difference variations in the particular foci of 
interoceptive attention make towards promoting salutary effects.  
4.8. A Caveat on the Primacy of Interoceptive Processing 
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Admittedly, it seems unlikely that contemplative training can or should aim to 
engender continual and total awareness of the panoply of interoceptive sensations present 
in each moment. Instead, skillful attention to interoceptive sensation may improve self-
regulation (Bornemann et al., 2014), allowing an individual to operate more closely to his 
or her optimal homeostatic state. We have argued that increased interoceptive attention 
represents one way to return to ‘being’ in a world that prioritizes ‘doing’, restoring 
balance between the two. This balance may then serve to promote regulatory flexibility, 
with the ideal of bringing ‘flow’ to experience, the alignment of being with doing in 
living a meaningful and satisfying life. It may be that one reason focusing on the body 
has such positive potential is that rumination, already shown to be largely a negative 
factor in experience, operates, by and large, by shifting attention to past or future 
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). By contrast, the body is always in the present. 
Attending to the body therefore anchors the mind in the present and away from 
rumination. Admittedly, there are other forms of present-centered foci that would distract 
from rumination such as watching television, and the research literature supports many 
short-term regulatory benefits of distraction strategies (Sheppes and Meiran, 2007; 
Denson et al., 2012). However, distraction may lead to later ‘rebound effects’ when a 
person is faced with an unresolved stressor compared to conditions in which that stressor 
was directly attended to (Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). While more work is needed to 
properly distinguish the effects of attention-based regulatory strategies such as mindful 
attention and distraction, skillfully attending to the stressor itself may be the more 
adaptive strategy (Kross and Ayduk, 2008), and in any case an improvement over 
rumination. 
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5. The Road Ahead 
5.1. Other Elements of Traditional Contemplative Approaches to Interoception 
Continued dialogue with representatives of traditional contemplative practices 
may further explore how they understand and modulate the flow of sensations through 
the body to enhance health and healing. From many Asian medical/contemplative 
perspectives, disturbances or blockages in the ‘flow’ of lung/ch’i/prāṇa sensations are 
related to disease, and free movement of chi is related to health, as well as to insight, 
kindheartedness, and other positive qualities, a central principle of Tibetan medical 
literature (Loizzo et al., 2009). Their understanding of the body is not only a matter of 
interoceptive awareness; it is most explicitly a pathway for exploring and deeply revising 
the sense of self, agency, and substantiality that bears on virtually every activity in life. 
The import of these issues, and their potential significance for mental and physical health 
outcomes could be a fruitful endeavor for future research.  
In these Asian traditions, the interior of the body, deep in the belly, or the heart, or 
deep inside the head, are all significant areas for focusing the mind. The mapping of 
channels and the “steeds of wind” moving through them further illustrate the body’s 
interiority as characterized in traditional Asian or Buddhist perspectives. We also see that 
varying the locus of attention, for example shifting one’s focus from breath to sound, or 
to a particular area of the body, may produce different results.  
Contemplative traditions may have theoretical insights on how placement of 
attention in certain parts of the body affects perception, cognitive, and emotional 
responses. Practices vary according to whether the body is alone or in a group, with or 
without direct eye contact, whether the scope of attention includes others, whether one 
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sits in silence or performs movement, whether one attends to sound or focuses on other 
sensory stimuli. There is also variation in the types of intentional and cognitive 
framework surrounding the practice. How these variations in interoceptive training may 
influence cognitive, emotional, and behavioral processes could be tested in empirical 
research.  
While the focus of this discussion has largely been on the use of contemplative 
practices in general, and mindfulness in particular, to increase awareness of interoceptive 
processes as a means to enhance self-regulation, other practices, such as those found in 
the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, involve the use of interoceptive awareness, sometimes in 
combination with mental imagery or somatic manipulations, to intentionally modulate the 
‘flow’ of sensations through the channels. Importantly, these practices take place within 
specific philosophical and ethical understandings, such as believing the nature of self and 
all of existence to be impermanent and interdependent. From an integrated mind-body 
perspective, in which ‘currents flowing through the body’ are conceived as the energetic 
support for consciousness, such “body-oriented” practices can be a direct means to 
impact psychological functioning and achieve meditative states of realization. One 
example is the practice of tummo, which has been studied by scientists showing dramatic 
increases in core body temperature (Kozhevnikov et al., 2013). While the short-term 
physiological outcomes of this practice have been studied for years (Benson et al., 1982), 
further attention could be devoted to understanding traditional theories of how these 
practices work and how conscious modulation of interoceptive sensations, especially 
when supported by accompanying intentional body-imagery, may impact physiological 
and psychological functioning more generally by promoting autonomic control of 
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physiological processes. Equally interesting in this regard would be a consideration of 
shifts in ‘energetic flows’ and related sensations that accompany the cultivation of love or 
compassion, or the use of simple sounds and their impact on mind and body. First-person 
descriptions can be useful here as well, since they typically will describe both physical 
and mental responses to such training. 
5.2. Future Research Directions 
Although we have rich contemplative traditions to draw from, as well as new 
interoceptive awareness-enhancing approaches and emerging theory from a psychology 
perspective, we are facing a shortage of tools, paradigms and appropriate measures to 
rigorously interrogate and integrate them. With this challenge in mind, we derive the 
following topics for further research from our considerations: 
1) Qualitative exploration of body-based practices from traditional contemplative 
traditions, and greater understanding of Asian (and eventually other) 
contemplative and medical models of the body that involve the ‘flow’ of 
‘energetic currents’ through the body.  
2) Further refinement of scientific conceptualizations of mindfulness, including 
exploration of first-person accounts, to see how these match the conceptual 
framework for interoceptive awareness provided here. Concurrently, we must 
continue to explore traditional contemplative texts and practice traditions for 
new perspectives, and to deepen our understanding of constructs already 
appropriated into scientific models of interoception.  
3) Developing and/or refining appropriate quantitative measures, objective and 
self-report, able to capture cognitive, behavioral and physiological changes 
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occurring with interoceptive awareness training, moving beyond measures of 
interoceptive accuracy to include attention habits, sensitivity to interoceptive 
cues, coherence of physiological and subjective changes, and regulatory 
strategies. 
4) Developing research designs that integrate first, second and third-person 
perspectives, such as neurofeedback, in which third-person objective measures 
of physiological or neural change provide second-person reports to the 
participant in real time, potentially modulating the quality of first person 
experience during interoceptive attention (Lutz and Thompson, 2003). 
5) Finding appropriate ways to operationalize behavioral interventions 
representing mindful interoceptive awareness, e.g. to the breath. 
6) Defining clear criteria for when or under which conditions interoceptive 
awareness is beneficial in treating patients with psychiatric, psychosomatic 
and pain conditions. 
7) Using neuroscience tools and technique to follow the process/flow of 
interoceptive information through the brain, e.g. by EEG oscillations or with 
fMRI with its top-down modulations. For example, interoceptive cultivation 
should be apparent in terms of increased correspondence between feedback-
evoked EEG potentials and subsequent physiological change. Conversely 
manipulation of interoceptive signals such as respiratory occlusion following 
enhanced interoception should provoke stronger and more reliable evoked 
potentials. 
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8) Develop longitudinal studies applying interoceptive awareness training to 
patients with clinical conditions. 
9) Consider testing effects of mindfulness training and other contemplative 
practices on existing measures of presence and agency (rubber hand illusion, 
virtual environment experiments) to see if they mediate improvements in 
health outcomes. 
By improving the measurement of interoception at subjective and physiological levels, 
and seeking to better understand the coherence (and lack thereof) between these levels of 
representation, it may be possible to broaden our understanding of interoception and its 
connection to motivation and well-being. Furthermore, such paradigms will help to test 
basic properties of information processing in the brain, investigating how we both predict 
and adjust to changing sensory stimuli, and how such stimuli are incorporated into a 
broader motivational milieu. 
5.3. Concluding Remarks 
Interoception has in many ways been a hidden sense, perhaps due to the 
challenges involved in measuring and manipulating interoceptive signals. And yet, 
interoception is arguably at least as important as the external senses, providing a sense of 
embodiment in the world that is foundational to a person’s subjective sense of well-being. 
Contemporary scientific frameworks largely lack the ability to articulate contemplative 
models of how energy within the body helps to determine well-being, but, concepts such 
as the simulation map offer an avenue for bridging this cultural divide. Indeed, the idea of 
energy or prana may one day be expressed as the allocation of metabolic and cognitive 
resources to afford neural representation of body states. While genetic, social, and 
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environmental factors clearly have great impact on a person’s quality of life, our goal in 
writing this paper is to bring to light the process by which health and suffering are 
revealed to us in the moment, in the hope of providing a more integrated psychological 
account. 
Fortunately, interest in interoception appears to be growing, and its researchers 
are privileged to have access to a rich repository of conceptual models from 
neuroscience, clinical and contemplative research traditions. The challenge for the field 
will be to pay careful attention to the claims made in each of these traditions, to better 
characterize their predictions, and in doing so to more even-handedly advance modern 
secular interoceptive science while respecting the validity of all of these perspectives. 
While perhaps no single researcher will hold sufficient expertise in all of these domains, 
through collaboration such integration is possible- we hope that the current paper and 
other articles contained in the special issue is testament to that lofty but achievable goal. 
It is our hope that we may all benefit from the continued study of interoception, in 
paralleling the advances modern science has already made in understanding the external 
world.  
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. A prediction error (PE) model of interoceptive inference, adapted from (Seth, 
2013), in which interoceptive knowledge is represented by 3 terms: priors (blue lines), 
i.e., the probable body state as informed by prior events; sensation (black lines), the 
current sensory input from the body; and simulation (green lines), the current predicted 
body state based upon integration of current bodily feedback and prior learned contextual 
influences. Critically, our model suggests that simulation rather than raw sensation is the 
closest construct to interoceptive awareness. Panel A: unexpected interoceptive events, 
such as a stomach ache, are represented as a PE signal that motivates a regulatory 
response to minimize the error signal. The simulation distribution is displayed as 
equidistant from the sensation and prior distributions to indicate the potential for updating 
from both of these information sources. Panel B: active inference reduces PE by 
weighting priors over current sensation. A high-specificity range of expected body states 
leads to large PEs from unexpected sensations, motivating attempts to modify internal 
states indirectly through cognition or behavior. Successful inference reduces PE by 
aligning incoming sensation to match the prior. Panel C: perceptual inference reduces 
simulation error by weighting current sensation over priors, updating the simulation to fit 
sensation. A low-specificity range of expected body states lessens immediate PEs from 
unexpected sensations, lending interoceptive simulations (i.e., future priors) greater 
sensory accuracy. Successful perceptual inference reduces PE by updating the prior to 
match incoming sensation. Active and perceptual inference may co-occur dynamically 
over time, shifting attention between sensory updating and regulatory response.  
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